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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: PARIS: WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *January, 1905.*

THE Alien question in England, as elsewhere, is mainly the Jewish question. In its acute phase, it is confined to London. There are Jewish colonies of alien and unskilled laborers in Manchester, Liverpool, Hull and Leeds; four or five per cent. of the miners in the Lanarkshire coal-mines are aliens; and Italians have recently been imported to work certain Northumberland mines. But, when the Alien Immigration question is spoken of in England, what is meant is the question of the settlement of Russian and Polish Jews in various districts in the East End of London. Americans, as they have had to face this problem on a tremendous and unprecedented scale, will probably make light of England's difficulties when they hear that the number of aliens in the East End, including the children of foreign-born parents, does not exceed 80,000. But these 80,000 have succeeded in raising the issue in a form that is, perhaps, more aggravated than anything that is known in New York. I speak with diffidence on the subject—it is well-nigh impossible to compare and estimate degrees of poverty and wretchedness and to trace their effects below a certain level. But I should be surprised if it could be proved that there is anything in the circumstances of the festering East Side of New York more disastrous and depressing than in Stepney or Spitalfields. Into the least prosperous and most congested districts of the East End there has been this constant influx of aliens from the poorest and most backward regions of Eastern Europe. They come bringing with them a lower standard of living than obtains among the native population; they congregate, by instinct and unbroken racial tendency, *en bloc*; and they neither assimilate their new neighbors nor are assimilated by

them, preserving in all countries and under every variety of fortune their traditional and impregnable aloofness. The broad results of such an influx may be easily summarized. In the first place, congestion becomes worse congested, rents rise with abnormal rapidity, and the quality of the accommodation declines in proportion. Secondly, the native is expropriated, displaced and forced to move elsewhere, if he is to maintain his British standards of decent living and not fall to the level that prevails in the Russian Pale. Thirdly, an intense and inhuman competition arises, with the inevitable result of lowering wages and degrading industrial conditions. I hesitate to quote statistics; but I believe it to be a well-established fact that the alien population of London furnishes more than its due proportion of crime and vice and destitution. What cannot be measured in statistics is the enmity that yearly increases between the native and the foreign elements. Anti-Semitism has rarely any religious basis whatever. Almost without exception, it is the economic protest of men who find themselves undersold and driven to the wall, by competitors who belong to a lower material plane. Such is its origin in the East End, and witness after witness testified before the Royal Commission that Anti-Semitic outbreaks were among the probabilities of the near future.

I need not go into the familiar results that flow from the settlement of alien immigrants within English-speaking districts. They may all be seen in the East End—the native turned out of his lodgings by an alien landlord to make room for alien tenants, and forced to live at a distance from his work; dwellings turned into workshops and factories where “sweating” is securely practised; the terrible overcrowding, the incredible wages. In Stepney alone, within the last six years, more than one hundred streets have passed entirely into alien occupation. In one of the public schools of that district, there were in 1895 two hundred and six English pupils and seventy-three foreigners; to-day, there are nearly three hundred alien pupils and less than twenty English. Over fifty thousand English have left or been turned out of Stepney in the past decade and their places have been taken by aliens; the old parish church stands in the midst of a foreign population; and off the main thoroughfares it is the exception to hear the English language spoken. The revelations of the Royal Commission of 1902-03 disclosed such abominations as aliens

working fifteen hours a day on trouser-pressing for a wage of \$1 50 a week; tailors "finishing" 300 pairs of trousers at three cents a pair; shoemakers working sixteen and seventeen hours a day, in underground cellars, for \$3 a week; men engaged to soften inferior skins for furriers by treading them out, barefooted, in vats, at from 75 cents to \$2 a week, working from twelve to sixteen hours a day and taking their meals standing in the vats; twenty-one women sewing in a kitchen sixteen feet by twelve feet, and seven feet high, for sixteen and eighteen cents a week—all aliens and all Jews.

Many influences have restrained England from dealing with the Alien problem by legislation. For one thing, the English people have in the past enormously benefited by welcoming and assimilating immigrants and refugees from all countries. But for the Huguenots, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the religious persecutions that lasted on the Continent till the middle of the eighteenth century, English industry would not now be what it is. What one may call the Huguenot tradition, the tradition that England shall always be the asylum of the oppressed of other nations, still survives and is proudly cherished. Moreover, the Alien question, whatever it may become in the far future, is at present not a national but a local question. Besides, the influence of the Jewish community in England has always and naturally set itself athwart any and every proposal for restricting or controlling Alien Immigration; and, though the number of Jews in England is small—probably under 150,000,—their political, journalistic, and especially their financial, influence is immense. Consequently, immigration into England is absolutely unrestricted and unchallenged. Such unfettered entry is, I believe, absolutely unique; and it is worth noting that it goes far beyond the example set by the Jews themselves. In Baron Hirsch's Jewish colony in Argentina, as well as in similar establishments elsewhere, Jewish immigrants are carefully inspected, and such as are mentally physically or morally unfit, are unhesitatingly rejected. England alone receives all who come to her—the pauper, the criminal, the vicious and the inefficient, as well as the industrious, the clean-living and the capable.

That this is carrying generosity too far is, I think, admitted by all moderate Englishmen; but no attempt to say where the line is to be drawn has yet succeeded. Success, indeed, seems farther

off to-day than ever. The question of Alien Immigration has been linked with the Fiscal Question, and the last hope of considering it impartially and on its merits is gone. The Protectionists, of course, are rigid exclusionists; and the Free-Traders, while prepared to keep out or expel the diseased, the criminal, the pauper and other alien undesirables, are not prepared to forbid the landing of those who cause the real trouble—the poor, sharp-witted, thrifty immigrants who do not intend to remain poor. What the East End cares about is not the percentage of criminals or paupers among aliens, but the percentage of hard-working and industrious competitors; and to keep them out is to keep all aliens out. No Government has ever ventured or ever will venture to suggest anything so drastic as this. Even the Royal Commission, that sat on the subject two years ago, did not go beyond advising that aliens should be barred from certain prohibited areas which officialdom might find to be “overcrowded,” and that undesirables should either be prevented from landing or expelled the country. These suggestions were embodied in a Bill which was introduced by the Government in March of last year, but so little earnestness was shown in pushing it through, that the Liberals had no difficulty in throttling it in Committee. Next session, it is probable that a similar Bill will be brought forward and passed; but its effects will hardly meet one of the East-Enders’ real objections to the alien. Those objections could only be permanently satisfied by excluding all aliens, or, at any rate all alien Jews, from England; and such a measure would hurt the East End, and indeed all England, far more than it would hurt the Jews.

The strangest England that any Englishman could imagine would be an England satisfied with its Army. The attitude of the public mind of this country towards the War Office, the almost yearly Army Schemes, and the deluge of Reports on all military affairs, is, so far as I can gauge it, one of bewilderment, disgust and despair. Nor can one wonder at this. Among the hundred and one lessons bitten in by the Boer war, none was more self-evident than the need of complete artillery rearmament. Except for eighteen batteries hurriedly purchased in Germany at the last moment, the British had not a gun in the field that was not surpassed by the Boer equipment in range, in accuracy, in power and in rapidity of fire. Nor was the Boer artillery by any means the best that was to be had. Had Great Britain been engaged with a

Continental Power, it is not too much to say that her defective artillery alone would have made defeat inevitable. It is three years since the Boer war ended; it is five since the shortcomings of the artillery were first fully revealed. The matter was thoroughly gone into by a Committee soon after Lord Roberts's return home in 1901. It took the Committee two and a half years to decide upon a new type of weapon—a period which, considering all the intricacies of the subject, was neither excessively long nor excessively short. But after the Committee had reached its decision there was a delay, a criminal delay, of nearly a year, during which the Committee's findings were reviewed by the new Army Council, the new Council of Defence, tossed backwards and forwards, and practically repudiated by the Treasury, which refused to find the money. It may have been a mere coincidence, but I believe it was not, that, shortly after the crisis of the North Sea outrage, all objections disappeared and the orders for the new guns—107 batteries costing about \$12,500,000—were actually placed. At the present moment, admittedly, the finest gun in the world is the French. Whether the new British gun will prove better than or slightly inferior to this king of weapons is a point on which the experts who have seen both speak with oracular hesitation. But there can be no doubt that the new 18½-pounder for the Field-artillery, and the new 12-pounder for the Horse-artillery, firing twenty rounds to the minute and with an effective range of 7000 yards, belong to the very first class of guns, and may easily turn out to be the top of that class. The only trouble with them is that they cannot be delivered for another two years.

Consider what this means. A war is raging in which Great Britain, under certain eventualities, is bound to spring to the assistance of one of the combatants. The Power, or one of the Powers, she would have to face would be Russia, and Russia is the only Power England is ever likely to meet on the battle-field that has a frontier practically coterminous with her own. A war with Russia would be preeminently a land war, a war for the possession of India, a war in which artillery would play a decisive, if not the deciding, part. It is at such a juncture that the British War Office nonchalantly announces that in two years' time it hopes to be ready to fight, that its present artillery is "the worst in the world," but that it confidently expects that twenty-four months from now the new equipment will be complete. For two years to

come this nation has almost automatically bound itself to peace; and, it is worth noting, in two years to come the Anglo-Japanese Alliance will have reached the end of its original term. There is something in this plain statement of facts that suggests nothing less than treason to British interests, to Japan, to everything that concerns the two Powers. In 1907, eight years after the inefficiency of her guns was made palpable on the battle-field, six years after Lord Roberts's return from South Africa, and five years after the conclusion of the Boer war, Great Britain will actually be rearmed and fit, if necessary, to take the field. And that is by no means a record achievement on the part of the War Office; it is simply a fair sample of ordinary British military administration. All that England can do is to swear savagely at some one unknown, and pray that she may be dragged into no war for another two years at least. Her prayers may be, probably will be, answered. But there are a great many possibilities and a great many rumors that point in another direction. It is whispered, for instance, that, situated as Russia and Japan are, there can be no half-way house between open enmity and open friendship; that they must either be at war or in alliance; and that, having learned to know and respect one another, and realizing the impossibility of final victory on either side, they will prefer to be allies rather than foes. This means that, instead of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a Russo-Japanese Alliance will be formed. Stranger things have happened. Again, one hears in London the most sinister rumors of Russian "aggression" on the Indian frontier; of a peace in the Far East that will leave her free to confront her real antagonist, Great Britain, with all her power; of how the best Russian troops are not with Kuropatkin, but are being slowly massed on the Afghan frontier; of how all is in readiness to spring the mine. Rumors such as these are the natural fruit of war-time; but it must, I imagine, have gravely disturbed Lord Kitchener to observe the admirable working of the Trans-Siberian Railway, to reflect that Russia has not merely a single badly laid line connecting her with Central Asia, but two solid and carefully planned tracks, and to know that he has neither the men nor the guns to meet one-half the force that is now fighting on the Shaho. It is, however, one of the historical privileges of Englishmen always to be face to face with such dilemmas, and always to escape from them somehow.

ST. PETERSBURG, *January, 1905.*

DREADILY the new year has opened for Russia: her "invincible" armies are held in check by the Japanese; her best ships are sunk or disabled; Port Arthur has fallen; her people are virtually in revolution; the fate of her autocracy is trembling in the balance. The change which has come over the Tsardom is as thorough, if not quite as sudden, as any transformation ever wrought by Circe's wine-cup. A little over a twelvemonth ago, the Tsar's will, even when capricious and aggressive, had the force of law among the nations, who, appreciating the blessings of peace, were willing to purchase them by considerable forbearance. At home, too, his subjects believed in his power, and trembled as they saw it applied to destroy what was best in the Finnish, German, Polish, Armenian, Jewish and Russian elements of the nation. International, as well as Russian, law was thus suspended or abolished by a decree of the Great Autocrat, who was probably the most powerful potentate the world had ever seen. Since then, his will has been crossed—abroad, by the race whom his Russians despised too heartily to hate; and at home, by a mere band of malcontents, who, unlike Pompey of old, have had but to stamp with their feet in order to bring legions to their ranks.

Unquestionably, revolution in Russia will prove to be a very different process from what it was in France or elsewhere. For one thing, it will be immeasurably slower; and, for another, it may at certain stages be marked by a degree of ferocity which the peoples of the United States and Western Europe can hardly realize. The situation at present is characterized by a condition of things which a year ago was inconceivable. The little band of "rioters," as they were generally called, has become commensurate with the whole articulate nation, which, having grown conscious of the strength born of combination, has united in a strenuous effort to pull down the citadel of autocracy. Students and working-men, who in Russia are generally the revolutionary "food for cannon," were the first to rush forward as the pioneers of the movement, seeking to put an end to despotic rule; journalists, novelists, professors, followed suit; landed proprietors, noblemen, merchants, cautiously upheld the modest claims of the writing fraternity; and, finally, the Zemsky Congress managed to get their demands brought to the personal cognizance of the Emperor himself.

But to those symptoms the Government paid little attention. The war, Grand-Duke Vladimir is said to have remarked, had rendered the people nervous, and it would be a mistake to make too much ado about silly outbursts of temper, which were devoid of real significance. In vain did remote Zemstvos, Siberian town councils, "converted" boards of noblemen, members of the provincial bar, university faculties, and councils of the High Schools send in by post, or telegraph, their hearty adhesion to the programme of the Zemstvo Presidents. The Government continued to make light of the whole movement, which would subside, said Grand-Duke Sergius, the moment fortune favored Russian arms in the Far East.

But the symptoms of the coming change were multiplied and, at the same time, their gravity increased. Timid men grew courageous and made public profession of their faith, regardless of consequences to themselves; princes stepped forward as champions of the peasants; officials who had theretofore stood by the Government announced that, come what might, they would throw in their lot with the people. For instance, an official who was sure to be a Governor of a certain province signed a petition for a legislative assembly, thus ruining his career. The unanimous council of the St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute forwarded a memorial to the Minister of Finances, recording their firm conviction that technical education is impossible so long as the political and social conditions inseparable from autocracy have not been changed. The Municipality of Yalta resolved to telegraph to Prince Mirsky its certitude that the high bill of mortality in the towns and cities of Russia was one of the direct effects of autocracy, and could not be bettered until the cause was removed. The legal bar of St. Petersburg and Moscow sent a deputation to Mirsky to petition for representative government.

On December 12th, the provincial Zemsky Congress of Kaluga forwarded an address to the Emperor, which created a sensation throughout the length and breadth of Russia. The members actually volunteered to rally round His Majesty and support him "against the enemies of law and order," *i. e.*, the *bureaucracy*, and they added:

"Believe us, Sire, when we assure you that speech, to be sincere, must be free; that joint work, to be productive, must be performed by citizens who possess equal rights and whose personality is inviolable; that

no conscience is pure but that which is not enthralled, and that no prayer is fervent excepting that which is offered up in the public temple of all denominations."

They end their address with a hope that the Tsar will summon elected representatives of the land to contribute to its peaceful development and prosperity.

The Moscow Town Council unanimously adopted a resolution declaring the absolute necessity of the following reforms: legal protection of the individual against the arbitrary measures of officialdom; the repeal of those exceptional regulations which give the local authorities power to imprison or banish anybody without assigning a reason; freedom of creed, of the press, of meeting and of association; a popular chamber to watch over these popular rights and to control the Government. The St. Petersburg Municipality adopted a similar resolution. Banquets were organized at which fiery speeches were delivered, like those we read of in Paris on the eve of the great Revolution. At one of these festive gatherings in a public hall, the guests numbering several thousand covered the portrait of the Tsar with a red flag, on which the inscription was painfully visible in white letters: "Down with the Autocracy!" At many others, the two men who killed Plehve were unanimously honored. The counsel for one of them—Sozonoff—said in his speech for the defence: "The bomb which blew M. Plehve to pieces was filled, not with dynamite, but with the tears of the widows and orphans of those whom he had sent to the scaffold, to dreary dungeons and to Siberia."

The imperial family, in the person of one of the Empresses, had been warned by royalties abroad that it would be greatly to the advantage of the Autocrat, as well as the autocracy, if a sop were thrown to the popular Cerberus. Good grounds, it is said, were alleged for this opinion, and His Majesty was accordingly attuned to a conciliatory mood. He became willing to make concessions, and to promise reforms; but he would not, of course, put sharp weapons into the hands of "his children," and still less would he lay down the powers with which God Himself had invested him. That was the Tsar's attitude—unforeseen by the Liberals who had looked forward either to frank opposition or graceful consent. And his acts were in harmony with it. He warmly supported Prince Mirsky, against whom an intrigue was coarsely spun by a number of courtiers and the indispensable

Grand-Dukes. He allowed the press to have its fling and the Zemstvo representatives to speak their minds; but there he drew the line. There must be no tampering with the rights and prerogatives of the autocracy. They at any rate should remain inviolable. Neither must the war be condemned nor peace with the Japanese advocated. Russia, and more especially the reigning dynasty, has need of a decisive victory over the yellow-skins. The newspapers were accordingly prohibited from publishing any of the cries for peace which were heard all over the country.

A very queer mixture of liberty and restriction resulted which puzzled everybody. But, from time to time, tokens of the Emperor's view on the main point were noticed, the significance of which could not well be mistaken. For example, the President of the Chernigoff Provincial Zemstvo had telegraphed to the Tsar, in the name of his colleagues, a petition for "the rights of the Russian people," including Constitutional Government. That act was unquestionably incorrect, because in ordinary times all such requests must be sent to the Governor, who may or may not forward them to the monarch. In the second place, no subject has the right to telegraph direct to the Tsar; and, thirdly, neither the Zemstvo nor its President is authorized to discuss or meddle with questions of international politics. Mukhanoff, the President of the Chernigoff Zemstvo, had therefore exceeded his rights in the spirit as well as the letter. Still, the present moment is exceptional; and it was hoped that the Tsar would shut his eyes to the misdemeanor. But Nicholas II availed himself of the opportunity to teach the Liberals manners, and at the same time to prepare them for what was coming. On the margin of the telegram he penned the following words: "I consider the act of the President of the Chernigoff Provincial Zemsky Assembly impudent and tactless. To discuss questions of State Government is not the business of Zemsky Assemblies, whose sphere of action and rights are clearly outlined by the laws." That censure was immediately published throughout the Empire, as a symptom and a deterrent. As a deterrent, it had no effect whatever on the thousands who felt disposed to imitate the Assembly of Chernigoff; but, as an index of the answer which was being prepared to the demands of the Zemsky Congress, it fulfilled its purpose.

That answer came at last. It was to have been promulgated on the Tsar's name-day, December 19th; but, owing to changes made

at the last minute, publication was delayed until the date coincided with the anniversary of the historic rising of the "December men" against Nicholas I in 1825. And then it came, not as the overture to a new era, but as the epilogue to the old one. It deals only with morbid symptoms, leaving the roots of the evils untouched. It offers very little in the way of concessions, and even that little may at any moment be withdrawn. For those and other reasons, the ukase disappointed every one. The quintessence of the demands made by the Zemsky Congress was a legislative body, which should be at once the source of law and the guardian of legality. The seventy-one* members who were in favor of the new creation argued that no imperial grant is sufficient or final because so long as the Emperor's will is supreme, he may always resume possession of the rights which he abandons, as, indeed, Nicholas II did in his dealings with the Finnish people. Hence, law ought to be something independent of his will. But the idea of parliamentary government was scouted by the Tsar's advisers, not excluding M. Witte.

For the "Russian Bismarck" was the master-spirit who prompted the reforms and even worded the imperial ukase. The present political crisis, say his enemies, was the stepping-stone from which he vaulted into power a second time. As Finance Minister, he had had a voice in almost every public question that cropped up, no matter how little it had to do with finance. In this way, he had wielded such vast power that he was regarded as the uncrowned Tsar of all the Russias. Naturally, time has been hanging heavily on his hands ever since his forced retirement. For, as President of the Committee of Ministers—the post to which he was relegated at the time of his dismissal some eighteen months ago—he has been like a Scandinavian warrior fighting shadows in the fields of Valhalla. He had lost the favor of the Tsar, and with it the secret of turning words into deeds. Therefore, he was ignored by the bureaucracy, and worshipped by the nation's friends, as a sort of Russian Necker, with a pacific revolution in his head.

But now M. Witte has suddenly returned to power, not, like Necker, joyously acclaimed by a confiding nation, but to the accompaniment of strictures and hisses. He has come, people complain, as the advocate of half-measures, lest he should be left in the

* Out of ninety-eight.

lurch while waiting for whole ones. With the help of a University professor, he drew up a plan of agrarian reform which is excellent so far as it goes. It proposes to make the masses equal to the classes before the law; and it allows the tillers of the soil to move from place to place, in lieu of tying them to the glebe, as Plehve was doing. It is a really helpful scheme; and Prince Mirsky, recognizing its merits, gladly unfolded it to the Tsar, who ordered a bill to be prepared on that basis. That was the first stage in the great statesman's second ascent. The next soon followed. In such cases, it is only the first step that is difficult; the others are taken almost mechanically. Witte, being again consulted by Mirsky—this time on the general answer which the Tsar should give the *Zemstvos*—was here, too, prepared with a rounded scheme. It covered the political as well as the agrarian field, dealing with the regulations for the press, the rights of religious non-conformists, the introduction of State insurance for working-men, the substitution of law for administrative caprice, and the creation of an assembly with a consultative voice in legislation. Nine points in all. And the ninth was held to be the number which gave value to eight ciphers. And yet it was a very small number. For what M. Witte and Prince Mirsky advocated was not a legislative assembly, such as we find in all civilized States of to-day, but only a very pale reflection; a consultative body elected, not directly by the people, but by the *Zemstvos* for the rural population, and by the municipal councils for the cities and towns. This assembly, which would probably have been termed a *duma*, would be devoid of all initiative and exercise no control whatever over the public purse. It would merely give its opinion upon bills which had already passed the Council of the Empire but had not yet received the Imperial sanction. As the Council of the Empire itself is but an ornamental institution—because, whatever view it may adopt, the Tsar's will becomes law all the same—it is clear that the projected *duma* would have become the fifth wheel in the State chariot. Still, even a shadow of a legislative body would have been welcomed by the people as a visible pledge of something more substantial to come. Possibly for that reason, it was advocated by Prince Mirsky, by M. Witte, and by three other responsible officials.

However that may be, the Emperor glanced through the document and, on coming to the ninth clause, struck it out angrily.

"It is lost time," he said, "to ask me to tamper with the powers invested in the Autocracy." The Prince assured him that the projected *duma* was more harmless than the Council of the Empire or the Committee of Ministers, neither of which had done anybody harm or good. But the Tsar, who had meanwhile consulted the Grand-Duke Sergius, was not to be moved. The Moscow organ of the Grand-Duke Sergius, who is more autocratic than the Autocrat himself, uttered the following veiled threat against the Tsar should he surrender any of his rights:

"Attempts to introduce into Russia political self-government have been more than once renewed during past centuries. But to not one

of them was God's blessing vouchsafed. The most instructive and cruel blow to any of those essays was dealt by divine Providence a quarter of a century ago, when our liberty-loving Tsar Alexander II perished at the hands of assassins *at the very moment** when he had laid the first stone of the rickety edifice of political self-government, which, happily for Russia, was left unfinished after his decease."

Naturally the ninth paragraph was struck out.

Now Witte was responsible for the plan which included the ninth paragraph, and that is greatly to his credit. But he has also undertaken to realize the modified project, with the ninth clause struck out, and that is a weakness which will not soon be forgiven by the leaders of the parliamentary movement. They bitterly accuse him of sacrificing to inordinate ambition interests of the Russian people which he knows to be vital. His Liberal friends hoped and believed that he would wait in patience until he could be raised to power on the crest of a vast wave of popular feeling. But the sceptical statesman, feeling that he might wait in vain for the spring-tide of political agitation, took the neap tide at the flood. And that is the head and front of his offending. That is why they now refuse to help him.

But the leading spirits of the Liberal party are as dissatisfied with the reforms outlined in the ukase as with their framer, M. Witte. They complain that the Tsar is selling dearly and in detail what they petitioned him to bestow upon them gratis and wholesale, and, worse than that, he does not intend to deliver what he has sold. They had asked for the abolition of classes and class privileges, and he promises the disappearance of certain legal disabilities which weighed upon the peasants. They had

* The italics are in the original.

agitated in favor of liberty of conscience, and he dangles before them the revision of the legislation restricting the rights of certain non-conformist sects, and the removal of disabilities which do not derive from statute law. They had prayed for the repeal of the coercion ukase, known by the name of Protective Regulations which place the liberty and life of all Russians at the mercy of the local jacks-in-office, and he merely gives instructions to lessen the number of the districts thus trodden underfoot. They besought him to grant liberty of the press, but all that he has undertaken is to remove "the superfluous" restrictions placed upon it, and meanwhile newspapers are being suspended or suppressed. They claimed the right of public meeting and of association, but these claims he wholly ignores. They had begged that Finns, Poles, Jews, Armenians—all the great non-Russian elements, in a word—might be delivered from the persecution from which they are now suffering, but the ukase engages only to strike off those legal fetters which are not required "by the vital interests of the State and the manifest advantage of the Russian people." Who will define these? The bureaucracy. And, above all else, the representative assembly, which was to have been, so to say, the corner-stone of regenerated Russia, has been relegated to the limbo of things that might have been.

What critics complain of, then, is, in the first place, that the measures announced in the manifesto would be absurdly inadequate, even if they were real. But they can never take root, because they are always liable to be withdrawn. That is the end of all reforms in Russia. Heretofore, every concession made, from the days of Nicholas I, has been either formally repealed or else cunningly counteracted by the Ministers of Alexander III or of Nicholas II. The very ukase to which the wretched serfs owed their emancipation had been evaded, and the peasantry were being tied to the soil anew by M. Plehve, when his life was suddenly snuffed out. And all those concessions had been not merely promised, but actually realized; they formed part of the law of the Empire. Yet that did not save them from abolition. And the ukase of last Christmas day realizes nothing. It merely sketches future changes for the better. But are the reforms thus promised likely to be durable, if those which were actually embodied in legislation were so successfully undermined? Russia answers: "No."

The very first clause affords an interesting example. The Emperor, we there read, deems it urgent to insure the victory of law over caprice. To this end, all authorities, all State departments, are to esteem it their sacred duty to observe the law, and thereby to help engraft upon the people that sense of legality which they now lack. Speaking frankly, that measure, if carried out, would civilize and transfigure Russia. But the people possess no faith in their ruler's intentions. They know that that clause is identical with the 47th paragraph of the fundamental laws of the Empire, which has been a dead letter for generations, owing to the greed of power displayed by the bureaucracy. And they feel sure that as it has been in the past so it will be in the future, because it is that same bureaucracy which is charged with the execution of the present ukase. Would the Emperor choose incurable drunkards as apostles of sobriety?

If the Tsar seriously desired to root out administrative caprice and establish legality, why did he not forbid the punishment of any of his subjects otherwise than by sentence of the law courts? That would have been at once easy and just. That he did not do it, is proof that his intention is conditional. Again, when Nicholas II writes of allowing the Zemstvos a fair share in local administration, he is but throwing dust in our eyes, complain the men of the reform movement. Otherwise, they add, all he had to do was to give back to the Zemstvos the rights which his grandfather bestowed on them in 1864. Again, if he wanted to tranquilize his people and lean upon law as a pillar of autocracy, why did he not repeal the monstrous ukase known as the Protective Regulations? They are not to be repealed, and nobody can tell how far they will be softened down or circumscribed. Why? Because the Tsar's scheme is to be like those of his predecessors, provisional, contingent. It differs nowise in spirit and very little in words from the manifesto issued early in 1903. Yet the reforms outlined then were construed by the all-powerful Minister, Plehve, as instructions for the forging of new chains!

Curiously enough, a Government *communiqué* was published a few hours after the ukase, which, to use a Russian simile, puts a spoonful of tar into the very small quantity of honey which the ukase contained. It forbids, under pains and penalties, all meetings, banquets, processions, newspaper articles in favor of a legislative chamber, and it also flatly denies that there is any general

demand for such a body in the country. The Zemstvos, too, are sharply told to keep within bounds, and are severely blamed for stirring up the people; while patriots, like General Kuzmin-Karavayeff, are accused, without being expressly named, of being the allies of the Japanese! Bitterness, not loyalty, is the inevitable result of these foolish accusations, which confirm the belief that the so-called reforms are conditional and temporary.

And the condition is, say the Liberals, that the Japanese hold their own against Kuropatkin. Once let the fortune of war smile upon Russia, and the reaction will make another clean sweep of all present "reforms." Hence the extraordinary endeavors which the Government is now making to crush the enemy by an overwhelming superiority in numbers as soon as the warm weather sets in. To this purpose, every nerve is strained; every source of strength is being tapped; reinforcements are being sent by land and sea, and even all the monasteries are being compelled to tax themselves "voluntarily." If Kuropatkin were to defeat the Japanese, he would also worst the Russian Liberals. But even then it is practically certain that autocracy would not win the day. For the war is virtually an examination which absolutism has to pass successfully or disappear. The two subjects are military skill and economic soundness. And in one of these, if not in both, autocracy is certain to fail. People feel this instinctively rather than know it, and are therefore resolved to continue their agitation. At a subscription banquet here on December 24th, 780 representatives of all classes of the population loudly applauded Professor Lotooghin when he said: "Let us follow the advice of St. Augustine, who writes: 'If to speak the truth be to foment disorder, then let us rise up, brothers, and foment disorder with all our might!'"

A banquet which was to be held in Moscow on the same night, and for a similar purpose, was hindered by the Grand-Duke Sergius. A political supper organized in the city of Kursk was prevented in like manner. Universities and high schools have been closed by order of the authorities, who consider the conduct of the students treasonable. The Council of the Moscow University, on the contrary, declares that the violent measures adopted by the authorities against the students have aroused such bitterness that lectures will have to be suspended until next Autumn. Henceforth, more than five visitors are not admitted to any

students' rooms, in any part of the Empire, for any purpose whatever, lest they should conspire. Thus the Government indulges in arbitrary rule and lawless violence, while the people seem ready to transgress laws more sacred than those of the autocracy in their eagerness to root out administrative caprice. In a word, Russia has entered upon the first stage of revolution.

PARIS, *January, 1905.*

IN endeavoring to comprehend the real situation in which M. Combes, the Prime Minister, finds himself, it is essential to remember that his enemies have long ceased to be only on that side of Parliament where he sees his political opponents. Many a man who supports him in every ballot thinks in his heart that he could do the anticlerical business better than the Premier; and he should not forget that the Socialists, without whom he cannot govern, are too strong men to be capable of gratitude, and may some day mete out to him the same justice that he has meted out to M. André. Even in the party to which he himself belonged when he succeeded M. Waldeck-Rousseau, he has bitter enemies. M. Leygues, M. Caillaux, above all, M. Lockroy, all three members of the preceding cabinet, cannot be said to be in the Opposition, yet they take advantage of every opportunity to criticise his methods. M. Lockroy, more especially, does not let a week pass without attacking his successor, M. Pelletan, in the Chamber or in the press. But these three men are lambs in comparison with M. Doumer and M. Millerand, both of them men of exceptional powers and capable of the terrible political hatred which is worse than the worst grudges.

M. Millerand's ill-will against the Prime Minister does not arise merely from his having belonged to M. Waldeck-Rousseau's cabinet: his grievance is of a personal character. When M. Combes was accused of having been privy to his son's alleged attempt to appropriate the "Carthusians' million," instead of being content with clearing himself, as he did without difficulty, he hinted that the man who had been silent when he should have spoken was the ex-Minister of Commerce. The pale-lipped eloquence of M. Millerand's reply will never be forgotten by any of those who were at the Chamber that day. M. Millerand is a barrister, but he never indulged in the long-winded periods one

hears at the Palais. Were it not for a tendency to subtilty, a habit of noticing details, minute particulars of procedure, etc., his plain, direct, impassioned speech would never remind one of the bar. The man is independence itself. A Freemason and staunch anticlerical, he has lately been excommunicated by the Lodges. A Socialist—the politician who succeeded in passing the only acts so far practically favorable to Labor—he also was ejected by the Socialists. He never goes a step farther than where his opinion leads him, and he cares not for consequences. When M. Ribot ascends the tribune, his soberly ornate speech and quickness of apprehension, together with his knowledge of financial and home politics, always secure him a respectful hearing, but he has now dropped into a party whose speeches are only talk. Everybody feels, on the contrary, that M. Millerand's addresses are as near acts as he can make them, and that every time he attacks the cabinet, it is with an idea that its ruin may ensue.

M. Doumer would be a hardly less formidable foe, if he had not been known to be one a little too long. Intellectually, he is not on a level with M. Millerand. He is partly a self-taught man, and never gives the impression that he could be capable of a wide political outlook; but he has friends, an admirable understanding of financial questions, and his mind is even more made up against M. Combes than M. Millerand's. Is it ambition or a less selfish motive? Perhaps both. M. Doumer, for several years, was governor of Indo-China; and I do not think that one single instance could be adduced of a man—diplomat, soldier or other—living abroad or in the colonies for any length of time, with enough power to make him conscious of his responsibility, and coming home as ready as he was to be plunged into the political whirlpool. A governor of Indo-China or Algeria certainly enjoys more independence and stands a better chance of attaining to statesmanship than a Prime Minister who accepts, as does M. Combes, constant reference to his majority. Coming home again, his first impression is that the head of the central power, with whom he has been more than once in conflict, is little better than a man of straw. In fact, M. Doumer used some such contemptuous expression soon after his return from Indo-China, and M. Combes had to give a great banquet at Laon, M. Doumer's own constituency, to afford him an occasion for replying to an address of the latter which had been nothing short of a declaration of war. Contrary

to his expectations, M. Doumer has not overthrown the government yet, and he is still president of the Budget Committee; but this position gives him a daily opportunity of authoritatively interfering in almost every debate, and he seldom deprives himself of the pleasure of doing so with totally unveiled hostility to the Premier. If it is remembered that men like M. Gerville-Réache, Vice-President of the Chamber, and M. Etienne, president of the group of Democratic Union, without which the majority would not hang together, are or have been interested, like M. Doumer, in the colonies, side with him on most questions, and suffer M. Combes instead of liking him, it will be realized that a majority with such a man *in* it—for his political creed places him in the Extreme Left—may turn out at any moment to be a mere fiction. In fact, even supposing the “groups” to remain what they are, the “*Temps*” has just pointed out that a cabinet a shade more moderate than the present could do without the assistance of the Socialists, and be sure of the twelve or thirteen votes that make up the present majority. But the groups may not be much longer what they have been for years. The great and almost inexplicable homogeneity of the majority in the last two Parliaments was the effect mostly of the Dreyfus Affair, which let anticlericalism loose and gave unexpected influence to the Socialists. Most of the bills introduced were anti-Catholic in tendency and, consequently, agreeable to all but the Right and the Centre—that is to say, to what M. Clémenceau was the first to call the “*Bloc*.” The *Bloc* consists of four sections or groups, each with a complete organization—a president, secretary, regular meetings, etc.—the more influential members of which not only discuss the course to be followed in every important affair, but by the tacit understanding of their friends are the Ministers of the morrow. M. Combes had made a practice of asking the advice of the four presidents of the groups before proposing any serious measure, and, if it took from his independence, this practice added much to the stability of his cabinet. As long as he had only antireligious schemes to suggest, even M. Etienne’s group—the most moderate of the four—ratified them as implicitly as M. Jaurès and his Socialist followers. But anticlericalism is not inexhaustible, and other questions now crop up which set the most listless deputy thinking. There are at present two under discussion: one, Disestablishment, still in committee; the

other, the Income Tax, in the first stage of parliamentary procedure. Both are full of hidden snares, into which M. Doumer, prepared with statistics and figures, is longing to decoy his enemy.

Disestablishment had long been thought an impossibility. The Radicals—above all, M. Clémenceau, who used to deliver a yearly speech on the subject—insisted so much that it was a necessity that people grew accustomed to the notion; and, when the Papal Nuncio was recalled in July of last year, it was spoken of as a matter of course. A remarkably industrious and ingenious Socialist, M. Briand, had prepared a bill which was said to be immediately workable, and it was rumored that it would be enacted into law offhand, and enforced by the end of 1905. Yet the first weeks of the session elapsed without a word from the Premier to bring the bill under discussion, and it began to look as if he was afraid of approaching the subject, when, one fine evening, at the end of an indifferent sitting, he suddenly laid the *projet* on the President's table. The astonishment which this rapidity of impulse created was not lessened when it was found that the Premier's bill differed in some important particulars from that of M. Briand, and consequently had to be submitted to the committee as if nothing had as yet been done.

A detailed examination of the ins and outs of the question of Disestablishment would be long and tedious. The ownership of the churches is the most important part of it, and I will content myself with a brief *exposé* of that. The Reign of Terror deprived the clergy of all they possessed, churches as well as lands, which were generally bought back from the government by private individuals. The Concordat of 1802 returned the religious buildings to their original owners, but the clergy agreed, for the sake of peace, not to dispute the validity of the sale of their property during the Revolution, provided a stipend of 900 to 1200 francs (180 to 240 dollars) were paid yearly to parish priests. Now, in the event of Disestablishment, M. Combes's bill provides that a pension equivalent to about half their present stipend shall be paid to clergy over forty years of age; but that henceforward no stipend is to be allotted to the clergy, and, what is worse, that the churches and houses of the beneficed clergy are to be taken back from them and only used upon payment of a fixed rent. The consequence is clear. Not only the priests, but their congregations, *i. e.*, a certain number of voters, are sure to grumble against

treatment which compels them to pay for what they look upon as their own. Every deputy knows that, if his constituents must have reason to complain of him, it should never be about additional expense for which he might be held responsible. Hence the likelihood that M. Combes may not be followed by his usual majority, or that he will endeavor indefinitely to defer a general discussion, in which case the Socialists will say that he is no better than M. Ribot, and a split in the *Bloc* will ensue.

Many deputies who generally support the government seem to be just as shy of the proposed law on the Income Tax. It is very true that our present financial system weighs more heavily on the humble than on the wealthy, as it is based chiefly on the amount of house rent, which is by no means proportioned to the real means of the taxpayer,—in fact, is a totally misleading sign. It is very true also that M. Rouvier, like most of his predecessors, unites the desire of being fair to that of securing an ample exchequer, and wants to get more money from those who have the most. But, making allowance for the perfect purity of his intentions, and for the difficulties inherent in every possible method of extracting money, it is certain that the reform he proposes causes no slight alarm to the taxpayers as well as to their representatives. Taxation of income based on the total wealth of the individual involves a valuation of his property, which, if disputed, entails investigation, and that means odium. This is not all. It seems an ominous sign that the Socialists, who theoretically will have nothing short of *progressive* taxation, appear quite content with the Minister's bill. Not only their political adversaries, but their friends in the *Bloc*, scent some deeply-laid scheme under this quiet demeanor, and the conclusion of M. Rouvier's speech in the general debate has somewhat justified these misgivings. In the first and by far the longest part of this address, the Minister was anxious to show that his bill was merely intended, as he said, to shift the burden from the right shoulder to the left. But, just at the end, he let his hearers catch a glimpse of the terrific productiveness of the future tax, when the old-age pension fund and the nationalization of railways became an urgent necessity. The next morning, an eminent financier, M. Jules Roche, translated these words into figures in the "*Figaro*," and the sight of this "little bill" is likely to scare away every one in the Radical party who is still at heart a *bourgeois*, that is to say, nine out of ten.

To sum up, anticlericalism is the order of the day, and a perpetual triumph for the Ministers when it seems to mean clerical money appropriated by the State. The same can be said of Socialism, when the word is limited to its purely political significance. The moment the progress of both doctrines places the deputy and his constituents face to face with contingencies involving expenditure, an uncertainty prevails which is soon followed by distrust and by a fall in the parliamentary barometer such as we have lately seen. The palmy days of anticlericalism are nearly gone, seeing that clericalism is little more than a phantom or a ghost, and the cabinets of long duration which we have admired in the last seven years are going with them. The reader ought not to forget that the average duration of republican governments between 1871 and 1897 was slightly under ten months, but he should remember also that in our system a change of government does not amount, as in England, to a change of policy. The fall of M. Combes and the advent of M. Doumer will not much alter the course of events which we have been able to follow from the days of Gambetta. Those who fear a reaction, as the result of those events, do not read history better than those who long for it.

WASHINGTON, January, 1905.

It is plain enough that, if either of the parties to the present conflict in the Far East were at liberty to proclaim itself accuser, judge, jury and executioner with reference to any controvertible question, the agreement which, at the suggestion of our State Department, was entered into by the belligerent and neutral Powers to respect China's neutrality, would not be worth the paper on which it was originally formulated. Nevertheless, in the note presented to Secretary Hay, Russia practically arrogates the right to decide for herself whether China has or has not committed a breach of neutrality, and, if her *ex parte* decision should be in the affirmative, to take such retaliatory action as to her may seem expedient. It should be patent to every student of international law that, as a matter of principle, Russia's position cannot be for a moment tolerated, though whether repudiation of it should be carried further than indignant protest, and take the form of forcible interposition, is, of course, a question of international policy. A world-involving war must be averted at all hazards:

to circumscribe the conflict in the Far East to a duel between the original combatants was, of course, the aim of the negotiations by which in February, 1904, Secretary Hay obtained from all the Powers concerned, whether belligerent or neutral, assurances that to the utmost of their respective abilities the neutrality of China should be respected. To punish a flagrant breach of that agreement by a precipitate recourse to coercion, which almost certainly would bring about a general war, would be to lose sight of the primary object. We presume, therefore, that, for the present, at all events, the agency relied upon to convince Russia that she must not arbitrarily, on unproved allegations of her own, set aside an international compact, will be moral suasion. This is the inference to be drawn from Mr. Hay's reply to Russia's note, which reply, by the way, has been communicated to all of the neutral Powers. The latter are reminded of their promises to use their best endeavors to keep China from becoming involved in the war. Those promises, obviously, would not be kept, unless the Powers which made them should insist that a belligerent, instead of arrogantly assuming to decide for itself that China had committed a breach of faith, should submit the question to impartial arbitration. If Russia has any solid foundation for her charges that China has violated a neutral's duties, she should welcome arbitration: if she has none, she, naturally, will look askance on such a method of settling a dispute. A country, however, which, like Russia, in order to maintain her armies in the field, and to shield herself against internal revolution, is absolutely forced to borrow money abroad, cannot afford to resist the pressure of international opinion. When the St. Petersburg Government finds that Mr. Hay's temperate remonstrance against its high-handed attempt to accuse and penalize China in a breath meets with concurrence in Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and even Paris, as well as London, it is likely either to withdraw the imputations made against China's good faith, or submit them to the inspection of an unbiased tribunal.

Now that President Roosevelt has announced a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, to the effect that Latin-American republics will be left to their own devices so long as they refrain from outrages upon foreigners and pay their debts, but no longer, it is plainly only a question of a short time when we must either permit Venezuela to be disciplined by foreign creditor-Powers, or take upon

ourselves the disciplining process. Mr. Roosevelt has made it pretty evident that, whenever he is again confronted by such a dilemma, he will grasp the second horn. He will interpose as a receiver, and administer certain revenues of the delinquent debtor, for the benefit of creditors. Our Government is already doing that in the Dominican custom-house at La Plata, and it must presently take similar measures against Venezuela, or once more allow European creditor-Powers to apply force. For reasons best known to President Castro, the customs revenues of the ports of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello—about a third of which were set aside by treaty for the payment of foreign creditors—are falling very much short of the figures exhibited before the agreement was made. Meanwhile, far from appreciating the friendly position taken by our Government during the blockade of Venezuelan harbors by allied European Powers, President Castro has been showing himself more stiff-necked than ever in his attitude toward an American asphalt company and other American claimants of justice at the hands of Venezuela. It is an act of insolence and folly of which this South American adventurer is guilty. If he had common knowledge and common sense, he would foresee that, should we make up our minds to bring fellows of his kidney to book, they would find our little finger heavier than Europe's loins. There are not a few long-headed Americans who, in view of our national determination to construct and maintain an interoceanic waterway across the Isthmus of Panama, already assert that we cannot afford to tolerate the continuance of anarchy on the southern shore of the Caribbean, and that, in self-defence and in the interest of the civilized world, we may be driven to assume a protectorate over the riparian tract stretching from the Isthmus to the Orinoco.

Why are European manufacturers profoundly interested in the twin bills introduced the other day in the House of Representatives, and understood to embody the President's views, the bills providing that the Interstate Commerce Commission, when a given railway rate is complained of, may substitute another rate, which may be confirmed or set aside on appeal to a Court of Transportation which is to be called into existence. They are interested in two ways. In the first place, if the twin bills to which we refer should become laws, products of European manufacture could never again procure a lower rate of transportation

from the American seaport at which they might be landed to the interior place of consumption—say, Minneapolis or Kansas City—than could be obtained by domestic competing products shipped from some inland point to the same consumers. In the second place, American products of iron and steel, manufactured, let us say, at Pittsburg, could never again secure a lower rate for transportation to New York, when intended for exportation to European markets, than they could if meant to be distributed and consumed in the United States. So much for the significance which the President's railway policy ought to have in the eyes of foreigners. We need not point out that the Russian producers of crude and refined petroleum will prick up their ears when they learn that the Standard Oil Company may no longer be able to get rebates from the American railways transporting its commodities to Atlantic and Pacific ports for transmission abroad.

It would be almost superfluous to point out the eagerness with which foreign purveyors of some raw materials and certain manufactured products are watching the reception of the President's intimation that some of the duties imposed by the Dingley tariff ought to be reduced, so as to adjust them to existing industrial and commercial conditions. Nothing could exceed the suavity with which the proposal has been persistently urged, or the velvety smoothness of the glove enveloping the proposer's iron hand. It has become tolerably clear during the month of January that the Republican leaders in Congress have succumbed to the dulcet but firm pressure exerted by the President, and that, although no extra session of the Fifty-ninth Congress will be called for the purpose in the coming spring, the task of tariff revision will be seriously undertaken by committees during the summer, and the changes agreed upon will be submitted at an extra session to be held in the early autumn. We say "committees," because, although the Ways and Means Committee of the present House of Representatives expires with the Fifty-eighth Congress, all the members of it have been reelected, and may reasonably expect to reoccupy their former places, so that, properly enough, they can confer unofficially with the corresponding Senate committee.

Well-wishers and ill-wishers of our country are alike concerned to note the position taken by our Federal Government with reference to the solution of the negro problem in our Southern States, a problem the gravity of which is already tremendous, and easily

might be aggravated by ill-timed and injudicious interference. Such interference was threatened in the platform framed last year at Chicago by the Republican National Convention. A plank in that platform advised that measures should be taken toward an early enforcement of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which provides that a State's representation in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral College shall be reduced in proportion to the number of adult male citizens who in that State may be excluded from the franchise. Although no distinct allusion to the subject was made by Mr. Roosevelt, either in his letter of acceptance or in his speech of acceptance, it seems to have been taken for granted by not a few Republicans that his silence implied approval. In pursuance of this assumption, Mr. Crumpacker of Indiana introduced in the House of Representatives, and Mr. Platt of New York laid before the Senate, resolutions recommending that alleged restrictions of the franchise in certain States should be investigated, and that, if these were found to exist, the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment should be enforced by legislation. No other incident has occasioned such widespread uneasiness, not to say alarm, throughout the South since a Force Bill was mooted under the Harrison Administration. It may be remembered that, at that time and previously, the late James G. Blaine expressed the opinion that the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had modified seriously the effect and potency of the second section of the Fourteenth. That section had simply asserted that, whenever a State should see fit to exclude the negro from the right of suffrage, the Nation, on its part, would exclude the negro from the basis of apportionment. Mr. Blaine held that, when, by a subsequent change in the Constitution, the Nation declared peremptorily that a State should not exclude the negro from the right of suffrage, it neutralized and surrendered the contingent right, before possessed, of excluding him from the basis of apportionment. It seems to follow that, as things are now, Mr. Blaine would have said that there is no ground for a Force Bill, the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment having lost its vitality, and the Fifteenth Amendment not being applicable, inasmuch as in none of the Southern States is the negro excluded from the franchise *qua* negro, but as a citizen falling short of specified educational or property qualifications.

We do not know whether President Roosevelt has been much impressed by Mr. Blaine's argument, which makes the application of a Force Bill a matter, not of ethics, but of law. We imagine that he was much more influenced by the moral objections to an enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, which were set forth effectively by a Southern thinker, Mr. E. G. Murphy, in the last number of this REVIEW. Mr. Murphy undertook to prove—and, in the judgment of many dispassionate readers, he succeeded in proving—that an enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment would work irreparable injury to the welfare and progress of the Southern States. He expressed the conviction that his fellow countrymen at the South would never consent to forfeit the representation in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral College to which their population entitles them, and that, sooner than submit to such a loss of political weight, they would level all the dykes which of late they have patiently erected to shield the intelligence, thrift and progressiveness of their section from being swamped by floods of negro ignorance and white illiteracy. Mr. Murphy did not hesitate to affirm that, in the past, the South had suffered as much, if not more, from the hide-bound prejudice and stubborn backwardness of illiterate whites as from the instability and corruptibility of uneducated and worthless negroes. In conclusion, he made a powerful appeal to warm-hearted and far-sighted men in all parts of the Republic, not to paralyze the efforts of the South to free herself from both sources of misfortune. Let the South go on with her attempt, he said, to make the franchise a certificate of merit, and thus gradually to purge herself of negro ignorance and white illiteracy. Whether it was, we repeat, Mr. Blaine's technical argument or Mr. Murphy's appeal to conscience that exercised the more influence on Mr. Roosevelt's mind, we are not competent to say; but certain it is that, in an interview with Judge Jones of Alabama, one of his appointees to the Federal Judiciary, he made an unequivocal announcement that he was opposed to the enforcement of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment. We know of nothing that has happened during the last fifteen years that is of better augury for the advancement of the South and for the welfare of the whole Republic.